Our need for public safety and our need for privacy are crashing into each other and we've got to sort that out.
If conduct is intentional, it could subject some of the criminal liability.
The more able we are to keep guns out the hand so criminals and spouse abusers all - the better. So the more information we have the better for law enforcement perspective.
I shouldn't talk about individuals in an open forum, at least without thinking about it better.
Sometimes the FBI is assigned to do background checks on people who are coming into government in the executive office of the president. Other times, not. A lot of times there are people who are arriving with clearances that already exist.
We're conducting an investigation to understand whether there was any coordination between the Russian efforts and anybody associated with the Trump campaign.
In my view, a huge portion of WikiLeaks's activities has nothing to do with legitimate newsgathering, informing the public, commenting on important public controversies, but is simply about releasing classified information to damage the United States of America.
Our focus is and should be on the leakers, not those that are obtaining it as part of legitimate newsgathering.
WikiLeaks is a important focus of our attention.
In our counterterrorism cases and our counterintelligence cases, we can issue all kinds of - of layers of approval in the FBI, a national security letter to find out the subscriber to a particular telephone number and to find out what numbers that telephone number was in contact with. Not the content of those communications, but just the connection.
It is a little bit difficult to talk about things that do involve classified matters in public. But I think the public needs to know that there are multiple oversight layers, including the FISA Court, congressional oversight, internal oversight within the FBI and intelligence community, that protects Americans from - under - their - their privacy rights while targeting terrorists and people who are trying to kill us.
What we want to work with manufacturers on is to figure out how can we accommodate both interests in a sensible way? How can we optimize the privacy, security features of their devices and allow court orders to be complied with?
Really bad people around the world, because of the genius of American innovation, use our products and infrastructure for their emails, for their communications.
We all love privacy. We all care about public safety. And none of - at least people that I hang around with, none of us want back doors. We don't want access to devices built-in in some way.
I don't know enough about the legislation , but I think the more information you can put in the hands of the people who are vetting, people who are going to be near children, the better.
The Obama administration was not in a position where they were seeking legislation. I don't know yet how President Trump intends to approach this. I know he spoke about it during the campaign. I know he cares about it, but it's premature for me to say.
What we do is we combine information collected from any lawful source in a single FBI database so we don't miss a dot when we're conducting investigations in the United States. What we make sure of, though, is nobody gets to see FISA information of any kind unless they've had the appropriate training and have the appropriate oversight.
I care a lot about privacy. I also care an awful lot about public safety. There continues to be a huge collision between those two things we care about.
Half of the devices that we encounter in terrorism cases, in counterintelligence cases, in gang cases, in child pornography cases, cannot be opened with any technique. That is a big problem. And so the shadow continues to fall.
The Clinton investigation was a completed investigation that the FBI had been deeply involved in, so I had an opportunity to understand all the facts and apply those facts against the law as I understood them. This investigation was under way - still going when I was fired. So it's nowhere near in the same place.
I believe that Americans should be deeply skeptical of government power. You cannot trust people in power. The founders knew that. That's why they divided power among three branches, to set interest against interest.
I'm in the business where I can't ever say there's no risk associated with someone.
Our process inside the United States government has gotten much better at making sure we touch all possible source of information about a refugee. The interview process has gotten more robust, so we've gotten our act together in that respect. The challenge remains, especially with respect to folks coming from Syria, we're unlikely to have anything in our holdings. That is, with people coming from Iraq, the United States government was there for a very long period of time. We had biometrics, we had source information. We're unlikely to have that kind of picture about someone coming from Syria.
Only a very small number of the e-mails containing classified information bore markings indicating the presence of classified information. But even if information is not marked 'classified' in an e-mail, participants who know or should know that the subject matter is classified are still obligated to protect it.
We did not find direct evidence that Secretary Clinton’s personal e-mail domain, in its various configurations since 2009, was successfully hacked. But, given the nature of the system and of the actors potentially involved, we assess that we would be unlikely to see such direct evidence.
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